আলাপচারিতায় স্টিভ ম্যাক্‌কারী

স্টিভ ম্যাক্‌কারী একালের শ্রেষ্ঠ আলোকচিত্রীদের একজন। ম্যাক্‌কারীর জন্ম ২৪শে ফেব্রুয়ারী, ১৯৫০। পড়তে ঢুকেছিলেন সিনেমাটোগ্রাফি, শেষমেষ পাস করলেন নাট্যকলায় (১৯৭৪) সম্মান নিয়ে। ছাত্রাবস্থায়ই প্রেমে পড়েন ফোটোগ্রাফির। তারপর একদিন একসুটকেস ভর্তি জামাকাপড় আর একসুটকেস ভর্তি কোডাক্রোম ফিল্ম নিয়ে রওনা দিলেন ভারতে। সেখানে বছর দু'য়েক নিজের মতো কাজ করে ঢুকে পড়লেন ন্যাশনাল জিওগ্রাফিক পত্রিকায়। বাকিটা ইতিহাস, মানুষ ও পৃথিবী নিয়ে তার অনন্যসাধারন আলোকচিত্রকর্মগুলো গেঁথে গেছে হৃদয়ে হৃদয়ে। অনেকেই তার তোলা "দ্য আফঘান গার্ল" (The Afghan Girl) ছবিটিকে এই সময়ের মোনালিসা বলে অভিহিত করেছেন। খ্যাতনামা এই ম্যাগনাম ফোটোগ্রাফার অসংখ্যবার ঘুরে গেছেন ভারত, পাকিস্তান, আফগানিস্থান, বাংলাদেশ, ক্যাম্বোডিয়া। দক্ষিন ও দক্ষিনপূর্ব এশিয়াকে এতো ঘনিষ্ঠভাবে তুলতে পারার কৃতিত্ব মনে হয় তার একারই।

গত ৭ই জানুয়ারী ম্যাক্‌কারী কুয়ালা লুমপুর এর ইসলামিক আর্টস মিউজিয়ামে তার "A Common Faith" শিরোনামে তার ছবির প্রদর্শনী উদ্বোধন করেন। সেখানে ম্যাক্‌কারীর আলোচনা শোনবার ও প্রশ্ন করবার সৌভাগ্য হয়েছিল আমার। পরদিন তার পরিচালিত মাস্টারক্লাসে আরো ঘনিষ্ঠ হয়ে আলোচনার সুযোগ ঘটে। ‌এই লেখায় সেই আলাপচারিতাই খানিকটা সাক্ষাৎকারের ভঙ্গিতে সংকলিত করা হল। বলে রাখা ভালো, ম্যাক্‌কারী ভীষণ রসিক, আলাপের নানা পর্যায়ে তার তামাশার নমুনা পাওয়া যাবে।

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

ইসলামিক আর্টস মিউজিয়ামে ম্যাক্‌কারী, আলোকচিত্র:লেখক

ছবি তুলতে হলে কোন বিষয়গুলো মাথায় রাখতে হবে বলে মনে করেন?

ওয়েল, আমি মনে করি ফোটোগ্রাফিতে কিছু জরুরী বিষয় আছে। তার মধ্যে একটি হল অপেক্ষা করা, কখনও তোমাকে সঠিক আলোর জন্য অপেক্ষা করতে হবে, কখনও তোমাকে সঠিক অভিব্যক্তির জন্য অপেক্ষা করতে হবে। ধরো, কারো সাথে দেখা হল, তোমাকে অপেক্ষা করতে হবে, যতোক্ষন না সে ক্যামেরার সামনে স্বস্তিবোধ করে। আমার তো মনে হয় ছবি তুলতে গিয়ে আমি মূলত অপেক্ষাই করি বেশী। আমি বড্ড অধৈর্য্য মানুষ, তাই অপেক্ষা করা আমার জন্য কষ্টকর কাজ (হাসি)..

ফোটোগ্রাফি আসলে শিকার করার মতো। তুমি খুব ধীরে, কায়দাকরে এগুতে থাক, তারপর শিকারের উপরে ঝাঁপ দেওয়ার ঠিক মুহুর্তটার জন্য অপেক্ষা কর। অনেক নজরদারি প্রয়োজন। অপেক্ষা করা হল পুরো প্রক্রিয়ার একটা গুরুত্বপূর্ন অংশ। কোথাও গিয়েই ছবি তুলতে নেমে পড়াটা ঠিক না। বরং চারদিক খেয়াল করতে করতে ধীরেসুস্থে এগুতে থাক।

আপনি কি ফিল্ম ব্যবহার করেন না ডিজিটাল?

আমি এখন পুরোদস্তুর ডিজিটাল। কোডাক আমাকে কোডাক্রোমের শেষ রোলটা উপহার দিয়েছে।। তারা এর উৎপাদন চরদিনের জন্য বন্ধ করে দিয়েছে। আর শেষরোলটা দিয়েছে আমাকে (হাসি)

লেখকের মন্তব্যঃ
১. ম্যাক্‌কারী কোডাক্রোম সিক্সিটিফোর ফিল্মেই সবচে' বেশী কাজ করেছেন। এই ফিল্মের স্যাচুরেশন ছিল অতুলনীয়। ২০০৯ সালে কোডাক এর উৎপাদন সম্পূর্ন থামিয়ে দেয়।
২. ম্যাক্‌কারী Nikon D3S ও Hasselblad H3DII-39 ক্যামেরা ব্যবহার করেন। ব্যক্তিগতভাবে তিনি Nikon এর ভক্ত

তো সেই শেষ ফিল্মটা দিয়ে কিসের ছবি তুলবেন?

মালেইশিয়া ফিরে এসে একটা স্টোরি করবো(হাসি, তামাশা ছিল)

সিরিয়াসলি, নিউইয়র্কের কিছু ছবি তুলবো। আর ছবি তুলবো পল সাইমনের (গায়ক) । পলের একটা গান ছিল নাম "কোডাক্রোম"। এই বিখ্যাত গানটার জন্য আমি ওর কিছু ছবি তুলব। এছাড়া আরও দু'একটা বিষয় নিয়ে হয়তো ছবি তুলবো ওই ফিল্মে।

ফিল্ম থেকে ডিজিটালে যেতে সমস্যা হয়নি?

বছর চারেক আগে আমি সম্পূর্ন ডিজিটালে চলে যাই। প্রথম দিকে সমস্যা হলেও এখন বরং ভালোই লাগে। লো লাইটে অ্যাকশন ফ্রিজ করার এমন সুযোগ ফিল্মে ছিল না।

পোস্ট প্রসেসিং এ কী সফটওয়্যার ব্যবহার করেন?

আমরা লাইটরুম নামে একটা টুল ব্যবহার করি

"আমরা "বললেন কেন? কেন "আমি" না?

আসলে আমি তো পোস্টপ্রসেসিং করিনা। এসবের জন্য লোক আছে। আমি বলে দেই, ওরা সেই মতো করে।

From অরূপকথা

অং সান সু কি-র ছবিটায় কি রিফ্লেকটর ব্যবহার করেছিলেন? কিংবা ফিল ফ্ল্যাশ?

আমি ফরমায়েশী কাজ ছাড়া আর্টিফিশিয়াল লাইটিং ব্যবহার করি না বললেই চলে। সু কি-র ছবিটা ন্যাচরাল লাইটে তোলা। আমার অধিকাংশ ছবিই ফ্ল্যাশ, রিফ্লেক্টর ছাড়াই তোলা।

ছবি তুলবার সময় কি খেয়াল করেন?

চারপাশে কি ঘটছে সেসব খেয়াল করতে হয়, অ্যাপ্রিশিয়েট করতে হয়। তোমাকে অনেক সংবেদনশীল হতে হবে। হতে পারে সাইডওয়াকে একটা ফাটল, হতে পারে একদল শিশু খেলছে সেখানে। কিংবা একটা কুকুর। বিষয়টাকে যে খুব সুন্দর হতে হবে তা না, একটা ইন্টারেস্টিং কিছু থাকতে হবে, যা তোমাকে নাড়া দেয়, তা যাই হোক। এই ধর রাস্তায় কেউ শুয়ে আছে দলা পাকিয়ে। সেটা আগ্রহব্যঞ্জক হতে পারে, তাই না? এইসব ছোট ছোট বিষয় আর কি..

আপনি কি ছবি তোলার সময় মডেল রিলিজ নেন?

নাহ, কখনওই না। চিন্তা করো, ছবি তোলার আগে তুমি কাগজ নিয়ে দৌড়াচ্ছ মডেল রিলিজ নিতে। আমি ছবি তোলা বাদ দিয়ে ওসব নিয়ে দৌড়াতে পারবো না।

সমস্যা হয়নি এ নিয়ে?

হয়, তবে খুব বেশী না। আর হলেও মডেল রিলিজ না নিয়ে আমি জরিমানা দিতে রাজী আছি। প্যারিসে একবার কেস করেছিল। দশহাজার ডলার ফাইন করেছিল। নো বিগ ডিল আমার কাজের তুলনায়।

উন্নতদেশে ছবি তোলা আর উন্নয়নশীল দেশে মানুষের ছবি তোলার মাঝে পার্থক্য আছে কি কোন?

আমার মনে হয় উন্নতদেশে লোকজন খানিকটা প্যারানয়েড, খানিকটা নিউরটিক। এই ধর তুমি কারো বাচ্চার ছবি তুললে, সে তোমাকে পেডোফাইল ভেবে বসবে। আবার বাংলাদেশের কোন শিশুর ছবি তোল, তারা বাবামা হয়তো ভীষণ খুশিই হবে। উন্নয়নশীল দেশে ছবি তোলা তাই খানিকটা সহজই বলা যায়।

ফোটোগ্রাফারদের কি তাদের ছবি নিয়ে লেখা উচিত?

ফোটোগ্রাফাররা যদি তাদের ছবি নিয়ে লিখতে আগ্রহী হন সেটা দারুন হয়। অঁরি কার্তিয়ে ব্রেঁসো, এডওয়ার্ড ওয়েস্টন, এরা খুব ভালো গুণী লেখক ছিলেন। আবার আরেকদল ফোটোগ্রাফার আছেন যারা, আমি মনে করি, ক্যামেরার মাধ্যমেই সবচে' ভালো বলতে পারেন। দুর্ভাগ্যবশতঃ আমি মনে হয় সেই দলেই পড়ি। তবে আমি মনে করি এসব নিয়ে কোন নিয়মকানুন থাকা উচিত না। আমি প্রচুর ওয়ার্কশপ করি, তাতে আমি তাদের সাথেই কাজ করতে ভালোবাসি, যারা ভালো ছবি তোলা নিয়ে পাগল থাকেন। আমি যদিও লিখি কিন্তু সেটা এডওয়ার্ড ওয়েস্টনের মতো ডায়েরী লেখা জাতীয় কিছু না। আমার দু'কানের মাঝে এসবের জন্য প্রয়োজনীয় ঘিলুটাই নেই (হাসি)।

আপনি তো অনেকদেশেই ছবি তোলেন। অনেকে ছবি তার ছবি তোলা হোক, বিষয়টা পছন্দ করেন না। এক্ষেত্রে আপনি কি করেন? আরেকটা প্রশ্ন, যতোছবি তোলেন তার কতোগুলো মাস্টারপিস হয়ে বের হয় শেষমেষ?

যতোই বোঝাও কিছুলোককে কোনভাবেই ছবি তুলবার জন্য রাজী করানো যায় না। সে যতোই ছবি তুলবার মতো সাবজেক্ট হোক, তোমাকে ওই ছবিটা হাতছাড়া করতেই হবে। এটা হবেই আর তোমাকে তা মানতে হবে। যতোই বুঝাও, যতোই আদর করো, যতোই তাকে ... (এই পর্যায়ে ম্যাক্‌কারী হাত দিয়ে কারো মাথায় চাটি মারার ভঙ্গি করে হাসতে থাকলেন) তোমার হাল ছাড়তেই হবে..

দশজনে ন'জন ছবি তোলা নিয়ে আপত্তি করবেন না কিন্তু একজন বাগড়া দেবেই। তোমাকে সেটা সম্মান করতে হবে। হয়তো তার পরিবারে কেউ মারা গেছে, কিন্তু সে চাকরী হারিয়েছে, তুমি জানো না কি চলছে তার মনের মধ্যে। ছেড়ে দাও তাকে, এটা নিয়ে আর গুঁতোগুতি করো না। হাল ছেড়ে দাও, সামনে আগাও। এটা হবেই, আর তোমাকে সেটা মেনে নিতে হবে..

সংখ্যানুপাতে মাস্টারপিস আসলে খুব কম। ব্রেঁসো তো বলেছেন, তোমার সারা ক্যারিয়ারে হয়তো ভালো ছবি থাকবে বড়জোড় একশ/দুশ। আমি তো মনে করি খুব কম ছবি শেষ পর্যন্ত মনে রাখার মতো হয়।

আপনি তো বহুদেশে ঘুরেছেন। আপনার ছবি তোলা আপনাকে কিভাবে বদলে দিয়েছে?

মনে হয় আমি খানিকটা পাগলা হয়ে গেছি (হাসি), তামাশা করলাম

আসলে আমি দুনিয়াকে খুব ভালো করে দেখার সুযোগ পেয়েছি। কতো ধর্ম আছে! কতো কৃষ্টি আছে!! কিন্তু সারা দুনিয়া ঘুরে ঘুরে আমি তাদের মিলগুলো দেখেছি। দেখেছি আমরা কতোটা একই রকম। আসলে একটা পাতলা আবরনের নীচে আমরা সবাই একই রকম, আমরা সবাই ভালোবাসা চাই, শ্রদ্ধা চাই, একই ভাবে স্বপ্ন দেখি..

আমার বদলানোর কথা প্রসঙ্গে বলতে হবে, আমি অনেক সহনশীল হয়েছি, আর শিখেছি প্রকৃতিকে ভালোবাসতে।

আপনি বিভিন্ন মানবিক পরস্থিতিতে ছবি তুলেছেন। ছবি তুলবার সময় কি আবেগকে দূরে রাখেন?

আমার মনে হয়, তুমি যখন আবেগময় পরিস্থিততে ছবি তুলতে যাও, তখন তোমার আবেগের কারনে প্যারালাইজড হয়ে যাওয়া উচিত না। তোমার আবেগ থেকে তোমার সেরকম মানসিক দূরত্ব রাখতে হবে যতোটা রাখেন একজন ডাক্তার। তার অপারেশন টেবিলে প্রতিদিনই কেউ হয়তো মারা যায়, কতো দুঃখজনক ঘটনা ঘটে। কিন্তু তাকে তো ভেঙ্গে পড়লে চলবে না। তাকে এমন মানসিক অবস্থায় থাকতে হবে যেন সে তার কাজ করে যেতে পারে, যে কাজে সে ঢুকেছে হয়তো মানুষের মঙ্গলের জন্যই।


আমরা যারা ছবি তুলি বিভিন্ন জটিল পরিস্থিত পরিবেশে, যারা জীবনকে উৎসর্গ করেছি এই কাজে যেন দুনিয়া আরো জানতে পারে, বুঝতে পারে, সেখানে আমি নিজেকে সেই সার্জনের জায়গায় দেখি, মৃত্যূ ও ট্র্যাজেডীর সাথে যাদের প্রতিদিন দেখা হয়..

এই লেখাটা তৈরি করা হয়েছিল একটা পত্রিকার জন্য, সেই পত্রিকা মনে হয় না খুব তাড়াতাড়ি বের হবে, তাই ব্লগেই ছেড়ে দিলাম..

Interview of General AAK Niazi

Abridged and edited version of the interview of General Niazi taken by Prof. Muntassir Mamoon and Mahiuddin Ahmed. Published in the book titled The vanquished generals and the liberation war of Bangladesh
-------------------------------------

Mahiuddin Ahmed: Would you please tell us about your general ideas about the events in the then East Pakistan?

General Niazi: People were coming up and telling me wholeheartedly in interviews here in West Pakistan about truth that was never told. The reason was that when Tikka Khan took over, he warned foreign pressmen, reporters and cameramen and threw them out of East Pakistan with disgrace. The result was that they came against us and they started talking and publishing concocted stories. They were depending on people who were fleeing from East Pakistan and going there as refugees and they were being brainwashed by the Indians and whatever they were told by the Indians and the result was that the truth never came out. …And then in West Pakistan, and as at that time there was martial law, the people were not interested and they did not try to find out what had actually happened. Bhutto and Yahya wanted to embolden themselves in East Pakistan and rule West Pakistan.

Therefore, they were not publishing anything. The result was that people started believing those concocted stories published in the Western press because there was nothing from the home press.


Q. You say these, General, from the knowledge of the hindsight. Did you know at that time what they were thinking?
A. I did not know because I was busy there with my own tasks. But when I came back here I found that the people did not know about the truth and people used to ask me silly questions. The result is truth hidden under the debris of farce and falsehood. Somebody wrote but as you see, they were keen to know who broke Pakistan. It was Bhutto, it was Mujib. …… if you read the stories and everything the brute war was by the outsiders.

Q. Who were outsiders?
A. [They were] America, India, Afghanistan and Israel. Therefore, they did not fight [the election] in the other provinces. ……..

Q. No. I think Awami League had also fought in West Pakistan. They had candidates in West Pakistan.
A. I don't know. But they did not want to, I think.


Q. But they had an all-Pakistan-based party.
A. They were people who were voters we seek. I made a party here after I came here.


Q. What was the name of your party?
A. It was Mujahid….. Fedayeen Party. The government did not approve it.


Q. Why? Why was it not approved?
A. Because it was my party. And Bhutto's government was against me! There were so many promises to get me a ticket. They say that [there are] people who get a ticket to go wherever they want. So there were these things that were never removed. Then I wrote this book. And I was almost apprehensive that a lot of people will start cases against me because I have exposed everything I found out. It took me 5 to 6 years [of] research to find out. In the book I have brought out everything you want. And if you had read it, [it will answer] any question. Government again went to the polls, [there were] people who liked Bhutto and who liked Mujib......We surrendered and all those officers who were fighting with me they were my students.....They knew me and I knew them......I did not like these atrocities. I will give to you [some examples] from the book of a British.....[that describes] atrocities committed by the East Pakistanis. I was here and you must have been there. When the cyclone came, it was a very serious thing. Real Admiral AKM Ahsan was the Governor. Shaebzada Yaqub Khan was the Martial Law Administrator and Commander of the troops. Ahsan first asked for helicopters and Yaqub.....did not give [them] though it was [his] moral duty.....The result was that he did not share their bad days and time. And then the other team came and that was a bad thing. That created some sorts of doubt in the minds of the people, that at a time of crisis these people did not help us. But people were one man. But he still was representing [a certain population]..... So that went against West Pakistan. But in the Army at that time it was equal: 12 battalions from West Pakistan and 12 battalions from East Pakistan. And there were 13 Unit Officers. So in a greater sense, Army had discipline although [there were some disappointments in East Pakistan].

The election came. Yahya was Commander here. Whatever he was as Commander-in-Chief, he was a selfish and a greedy man. He removed Ayub by something, whatever it was, and he encouraged Mujib to carry out things so that martial law would not be declared if [nothing is done] against him. And they had the understanding that if Mujib [would] certify him he would remain. So that whatever you may call it, he broke parity and one unit .....By breaking parity we became 35%, East Pakistan became 35% and then again by one unit…


Q. I mean, votes were always allotted according to population.
A. No. But in parity it has to be made equal. 50 seats here and 50 seats there irrespective of proportionate population of the respective units.…….. but before that [there was a] reason [to fear] ..... a Hindu population that was educated in East Pakistan. If they make the Government the Hindu population would have [upper] hand there.


Q. What was the number of Hindus there?
A. It was at that time one crore. They were all educated. They were holding good posts. Most of them were professors and teachers. And the constitution to be adopted by them will have Hindu iron hand in it. And that was the idea given here.


Q. Where was this idea given? In West Pakistan?
A. Yes.


Q. But did you also have the idea yourself?
A. No. No. I was a soldier. I had nothing to do with it. At that time, our training was different. That [training taught us not to] bother about what happened. You are [to be] loyal to your institutions and constitution. We are loyal to institutions and the constitution. Whatever happens makes no difference.


Q. Which institution were you loyal to?
A. My unit, Army, the institutions and the constitution ….. under which I had taken oath that I will be faithful to the country .… At that time, we had a low profile look at the civilians. And whoever came from outside, if he was a politician, I did not allow him to enter the cantonment. I never allowed anybody, even if they were my friends. I did not allow them to enter the cantonment if they had taken part in politics. So then the elections there were rigged.


Q. Which was 1970 elections?
A. Yes. Fazlul Quader Chowdhury, Monem Khan, Farid Ahmed and a couple of other people who were pro-Pakistani told me about this. ….that a man who is planning to do everything [had to be] stopped. Then if Martial Law Administration had stopped those people [from contesting in election] ..... we would win 50 to 60 seats in the election. And at that time, if we had 50 to 60 seats Mujibur Rahman would not have a thumping majority. And he would not have a high hand in the affairs. But then again blame came on the Martial Law. So elections in the West Pakistan were fair but not in East Pakistan. I feel, you remember, Fazlul Quader Chowdhury was an honourable man, Sabur Khan, Monem Khan, Moulavi Farid Ahmed of Teknaf - all the people were pro-Pakistani, and they used to come to me. And everybody use to come..... In Mymensigh, I went into the crowds and the people felt I am not doing any harm to them. But I used to go into the crowd and nothing happened. Mujib won the elections. Yahya [came] .....here. He kept saying: here is my future Prime Minister. But he told him: you are not my future President. Mujib said: I am a politician. So Yahya got a shock - that I had broken one unit for him, I broke parity for him, I did not bother what he is doing in the election. In the mean time Bhutto, who had some 82 seats, .....went to Mujib. He wanted a share in the Government. He said, meet Major No.2. Mujib said, No. 'You give me the foreign ministries'. 'No'. 'Give me the post of Speaker'. 'No'. Then he began overtures otherwise, and Yahya told him that this man has promised to make me the President. 'I will make you President. We have West Pakistan for us, and you will be the President, I will be the Prime Minister'. So Bhutto took him to Larkana for shikar (game party). And then they made a plan and that was 'Larkana Plan'. It was 'leave East Pakistan without a successor government'.


Q. Yes you have said in your book, you should have East Pakistan without a successor government. But how did you know about the Larkana Plan? I mean who informed you?
A. Yes. It was secret. But there was a chap - Deputy Super of Police (DSP) Quazi Azam and when security people knew this [they] sent Quazi Azam to Larkana. There he went out and met a man when they made this plan. They made the plan in a boat there. But there was somebody who was with them. I learned through him and Quazi Azam through him got the details. And when he derided Bhutto came to know of it. He wanted to suppress it thinking we would not know about that. That is how it came out otherwise it would have remained a secret. But someone was intelligent who reported and it was leaked to the papers.

Q. When did it come in the papers?
A. In those days and I think it was in February. Then they started working on that plan. The plan.....was to fight in the West Pakistan which means that in the East we would have few troops and the bulk of them would be in West Pakistan. And we [would] defeat the Indians here in West Pakistan and we will lose East Pakistan. So after the Larkana Plan they started working on it and forgot about the plan that the best luck is in the West. That plan could be implemented only with my defeat and not with my victory or any political settlement. In case of critical and political settlement politicians were to get the government. Yahya Khan could be taken to task and Bhutto will have no place because the majority of East Pakistan was there. So he whoever is left, he goes into the background. Thus the possibility of a political settlement was ruled out completely.

Q. So you were the Commander of the Eastern Command. You were aware that there was Larkana Plan.
A. No. I did not. I did come to know of these things only when I came back and was writing a book.

Q. How come that it came out in the papers here in those days and you were not aware of it?
A. Then Yahya died. Bhutto lost his power and a lot of people came [up with a] lot of things. So they started working on [their plan]. They could gain only if I was defeated. They thought guerilla warfare never failed. But I defeated the guerillas, however, in two months. I fought against the Indonesian guerillas, I fought against the Chinese guerillas in Malaya.

Q. You have mentioned that in your book..
A. Therefore, I had the power to catch a thief and set a thief in a new home. Within two months, I made a stand and it was considered a lightning campaign in the history of guerilla warfare.

Q. When did this guerilla warfare start?
A. The day I took over.

Q. Which was…?
A. 10th April of 1971. At that I was very happy. Before that they were mud-clad. But from that day they were declared a force, uniformed. Colonel Osmani was my friend and he became their chief. And now when Osmani was at GHQ (Pakistan Army headquarters), I was here. One of my titles is Tiger. So whenever he rang me up, he would say, Tiger, this is Tiger speaking.

Q. That you experience a piece of it also!
A. So I said, why you are senior to me, because he belonged to East Pakistan (East Bengal) Regiment and their sign was Tiger. So he became C-in-C. I was happy that I shall be fighting against armed people in uniform and not against some civilians.

Q. Besides Tiger, what other titles do you have?
A. Tareq bin Ziad, that was given me by a West Pakistani, and Meridonne. I was in Rajput Regiment and you know they were Rajputs of Rajputana. They are brave people and one of their heroes is called Amar Singh Rathore. And my Mussalman colleagues used to call me Amar Bahadur.

Q. You have explained the operation plan, the battle lines etc. in your book. We will be sort of asking you some other questions like on 10th April, the idea of engaging Tikka Khan was to go for a lighting campaign on 25th March i.e. Operation Searchlight, to be followed up with mopping up operations and all that so that, you know, agitation were to be quelled and then they would go for a political settlement. This was the plan. But if you, according to you, had combed the rebels, the Mukti Bahini, within 2 months, then why didn't they go for a political settlement? Why did they opt for a military operation because it was very difficult to send you any assistance from West Pakistan over Sri Lanka?
A. I will tell you that. Yahya and Yaqub was there. Yaqub had a plan : Blitz.

Q. When was Operation Blitz planned?
A. It was in the early 70s.

Q. Early '70s? Before the election or after the elections?
A. No. No. Even before the election. In 1969 he made the plan.

Q. You mean to say this is the plan that designed …..
A. No. No. If there was trouble, whether election or no election, if there is any sort of trouble, he made the plan to quell the rising.

Q. No. I mean Yaqub has made some response in the papers in reference to your Operation Blitz, did you see that?
A. I saw it. That is another question. Field Marshal Rommel said, no plan survives context. If the commander joins the battle according to the plan then that is good enough. How he has to fight is tactical. So plans are just outlines. If there is a plan, whatever the plan, it will be use of force. Without use of force what you want you acquire little. Mujib and his associates started committing atrocities. And he did it and kept quiet. He could have nipped the things in the bud. He had the power that time. East Pakistani troops did not mutiny yet. They were with us. There were only mobs, crowds and not very organized.

Q. When do you think he should have gone into the operations?
A. After the election. When they were asking for the handing over of power in those days…

Q. Before, you mean, 25th March?
A. In March, he should have gone into action but he did not do it. He delayed and let the game away. Then Tikka Khan went there and the Bengalis were in civil riots. Before that Urdu-speaking people were being attacked. Yaqub could have stopped it…. According to intelligence, on the very same night of 24th or 25th March, Mujib was to declare independence and take action. So they took action a couple of hours before. They used power. But that action was harsh. Too harsh.

Q. 25th night action?
A. I have mentioned already.

Q. It was too harsh?
A. Too harsh.

Q. I also say too harsh.
A. It depended on the person who was doing it. [When] under fire and the people behaved very curiously.....The result was that he said I want land not the people.

Q. It was Tikka Khan?
A. Yes. He said, I want land and not the people. So when Yahya saw it, he was horrified. So he decided to change him within 10 days. And to change a General in operation was a horrible thing. It was a death warrant. Then they worked over [it]. They asked some people …. and they said, forget the seniority and forget about rules, send a person who can do it. So I was selected although I was trailing far behind. There were 12 Generals senior to me. When I was sent 2 Generals senior to me had already failed there. I was selected. I went there and found out everything was in topsy turvy. Pakistan Army was fighting around the cantonments and cities they were holding. The rest of the province was under the control of the Mukti Bahini. Provincial government was not working. Boundaries had vanished and the Hindus were coming and going freely. When I took over, according to our sources, our troops elsewhere were surrounded. Their only communication was helicopters. Roads and river routes were cut between Dhaka and the rest of the country. So what happened was that there was a certain Field Marshal - I can't remember his name - as the people called him. Somebody told him about the situation our troops were facing. So he said, the situation is excellent and I will attack. I [told] him the same thing: you are surrounded, your communications are cut, you have no supplies, situation is excellent, I will attack. And I attacked. And this was certainly a surprise as they were not expecting it. They had expected and planned if a guerilla killed one Pakistani soldier a day they will be finished in two months. So they were not expecting I would dare an attack on them. When I jumped I told them: reach the borders … fastest and must. This is my order. I repeat it. I went to the area commanders, nothing on wireless because I could not keep it secret, nothing on the telephones because the Bangalis were holding them. So I went there and [told] them [to] reach the border fastest and must. And they went straight up to the borders and wherever they went [they went] with everything and they started working. This was secret. And that plan that the Bengalis will be able to establish Bangladesh with guerillas they had. They had three lac men. But my total strength was 45 thousand men. Out of 45 thousand 34 thousand were regular and 11 thousand were Policemen and other ranks. So the record has it that in Vietnam the Americans used 7 lac of their own troops with 10 lac strong from the South Vietnamese Government Forces, that is, it was a total strength of 17 lac against guerillas. In Algeria, France used 10 lac troops. I had to face 4 lac guerillas with troop strength of 41 thousand and that was [a] slap on the Bangalis, Russians and Indians. Because Indians were telling and ……… Russians were telling then, 50 thousand Indian regulars were with guerillas. So that was the state when I took over. I had not the equipment required, …... no radar, no night visibility apparatus …… I asked C-in-C General Hamid: I am just on the border, allow me to enter India. But as they were expecting my defeat they got alarmed when they heard it. And before that, knowing that they may stop it…. that is why I did not tell them what I was doing. So they told me to freeze on the border, 'don't enter India'. Then after two days Hamid came. Again I said to him, ' If you allow me now, I am in their heart. They are on the run. We are cleansing them. Shooting and chasing after them. I will capture a vast chunk of Bengal on the side of Brahmaputra and Nagaland and all the things. If you give me one more permission, I will take Calcutta as well with my two divisions. I will destroy Indian Forces and take the whole area of Assam, Bengal and Bihar. India will be beaten, he said, all these are sound and I can help you. But Hamid came to see that we cannot succeed and to have a policy of open war with India. Indians have admitted in their books that had Yahya struck at that time he could have achieved very useful targets in both the wings of East and West. I would have broken into Kashmir…… and all the sites. But they did not allow me. And the Indians were not prepared at that time with all that arms build up. This was possible up to October. After October, they got concentrated and it was not possible on my side because I did not have everything complete. I …. was short of 18 heavy guns….. 74 medium range guns and about a hundred attack and anti-tank guns. I was short of it. …with all the infantry.

Q. What was the situation with the Air Force?
A. Air Force had one aircraft. They had no fighting capability. Out of six combat aircraft all were gone. I had only infantry power.

Q. This I think was quite excellent. But what about the situation within Bangladesh. Were you able to bring your own men or were you using [a] lot of these people from the civil armed forces?
A. We used some with reasons.

Q. When did you decide to recruit these civil armed forces: Al-Badar, Al-Shams?
A. How essential it was has been a matter of conjecture. When my troops were…..

Q. When was this…?
A. This was I think… at the end of May. Then I started recruiting.

Q. And they were directly under your command?
A. Yes. Some people say, it was under Jamaat-Islami. But I would not entertain that. Al-Badar and Al-Shams took the name because, the German, the ruler of the Germans called Al-Badran …

Q. In your book you said that you brought back the leaders who….
A. Some of them who were wanted by the people who were known leaders, they were known. They [would] be eliminated….

Q. Why?
A. Because they were famous people.

Q. Who were these people?
A. They were Bengalis.

Q. Do you have any…?
A. I didn't know because my staff knew them and supported [them].

Q. Because Jamaat-i-Islami supported in raising Razakars?
A. Even Bengalis were supporting me.

Q. Of course, the Jamaat-i-Islamis were Bengali people.
A. They were not Jamaat-i-Islami and I hate [politicians], I did not allow any body who belonged to parties to enter the cantonment. So how could I ask a political party to help in it.

Q. What was the role of Rao Farman Ali?
A. He was adviser to the Governor.

Q. So he had nothing to do with …..
A. He had nothing to do with the fighting and everything. He was only adviser. Army was between the Governor and me.

Q. You know the international press and the independent media, even they were reporting about the atrocities and other things. You see the Martial Law authority would become responsible and not the adviser. Would it be so?
A. Adviser … when Malik became Governor, Yahya told me any order from Malik will be considered as order from me. So he issued orders.

Q. You said in your book?
A. That we had been given civil armed forces and he had Police and EPR … under him. We were using them under pressure. But the men …

Q. I mean, they were under your command.
A. But they were being paid …..

Q. I mean they were under your command, wherever needed you used…
A. But they were paid by the civilian …

Q. But all these actions wanted by the Martial Law authority. They may have been indulging in activity … actually what happened they used civilian … they might have allowed Police to act, you see, to do something which the Government doesn't want to do.
A. No. when I took over, Tikka was the Chief Martial Law Administrator. It had nothing to do with the Martial Law. Martial Law was under Tikka Khan. Farman Ali was his adviser.

Q. No. He was the Chief Martial Law Administrator.
A. I began under Tikka Khan, the CMLA. I began in September but up to September whatever it was, it was Tikka Khan …

Q. But you wrote in your book that Rao Farman Ali meticulously obeyed Tikka Khan's order and the massacre was done as you said in your book, yes, by Rao Farman Ali and he said that he does not know anything about it.
A. But he prepared the plan, when Tikka took over he had these advantages with him - he was Martial Law Administrator, he was Governor, he was Commander of the troops … so on the night the orders were issued by him and Raja Khadem.

Q. So Tikka was the supreme commander. In Dhaka…
A. Not, this was…. He [Farman] said that the green fields of East Pakistan should be made red. He said, I think Kazi Zafar in one of his political speech in March said, whatever may be, it was written in diary : the green field of East Pakistan should get red. Whoever that was, the diary was shown to Bhutto and Mujib. They were given the diary with dates given.

Q. We are specifically asking about the killing of the intellectuals towards the end, you see, and he [Farman] denied.
A. Many intellectuals were known naturally to me but only men with weapons were my enemy …. intellectuals or no intellectuals it did not matter. But ..Altaf Gauhar has given or somebody told me that Farman has a list of intellectuals. I sent somebody who checked it and Farman deleted two names on his request. I did not know about it. But I knew it from Altaf Gauhar.

Q. So Farman was behind it?
A. It did happen I mean Altaf had noted something. I could have done anything I liked. Why I should have a list of thinkers….

Q. That is what I was saying. I mean, you had no knowledge of that because you were then…
A. And I am telling you I am so grateful to Bengalis, most of them … they were not happy with this Indian interference. They were blaming it. You think, without the help of these people I withheld 5000 men ….I am not a Fereshta.

Q. May I ask you General Niazi what was your personal feeling. I mean, you were, you know, almost abandoned as you have now discovered, after you came back —Would you say what was your feeling because there were people who were Pakistanis. They were the founder of the Muslim League- they were the founder of the Pakistan Resolution.
A. I tell you one thing…

Q. You had any doubts in your minds that they were lesser Pakistanis?
A. I still believe that they were Mussalmans.

Q. So you discovered this?
A. I discovered that. I knew them before. In 1965 War they fought with me!

Q. But the brain-washing of the troops was that these are all Hindus … you …
A. No. No. …..I have to tell you a story. Once there was a young, bright upcountry Hindu boy. It so happened one day, my guard threatened him saying, why have you come? I shall kill you! The reason for this I don't know. The young man sought my protection and …I told him, 'Why do you kill him?' I gave my Chinese rifle to him ... suppose I might be in his place, it is possible that you would kill me! You are killing
him finding him alone. Then come on, so kill me, brat! And now be away from here and mind your own jobs. I told you ….no. no. I have told you Hamid told three friends —for a critical political settlement the Bengalis are ready. Because Fazlul Quader Chowdhury was coming to me and asking me, if you agree to contact those people. They will listen to us now. He said, ...[the] critical thing is too difficult for you…. because they did not want political settlement and because political settlement was against Bhutto, they did not want it. political settlement was possible up to November. It could happen. Political settlement was possible when Bhutto went to the United Nations...by handing over power to Mujib and then cutting relations/union with Bangladesh. There would have been no surrender, anything of the sort. But that was not going to happen. I was forced to surrender. I was not beaten. I could not be beaten. Have I had at all to make surrender I could have done so considering my overall situation. They were biding their times over there and cutting their senior role in the cities. They lost over here. They lost one Pakistan, in West Pakistan, they surrendered. Malik wrote about him warning Yahya that if General Niazi did not surrender, he will lose West Pakistan. He was the Governor, he was Martial Law Chief, and he was everything. This is he who was saying. And the Army says the same thing. And [the] order from them said, I had to surrender.

Q. What I was asking, you said that people of East Pakistan were better Mussalmans. Then what did you mean by 'Betrayal of East Pakistan'? What does this betrayal mean?
A. West Pakistan? No, not the people of East Pakistan. But those who were in power in West Pakistan, who were at the helm of affairs - Yahya and Bhutto - not the Pakistani people. They like [Bangladeshis] and still like them. It was those greedy people [who] wanted to rule them . I don't blame them.

Q. You wrote 3000 officers were killed and wives and daughter were raped. What is its source? Because if it had happened it would have been reported in the newspapers. We did not we have any sort of report. What is your source?
A. The sources were my colleague officers who fled and those women raped.

Q. How did you claim that figure?
A. Because we were there.

Q. If I say, it did not happen. What will you say?
A. It was a report.

Q. No. It was an assumption. Because even Farman Ali and other sources said, no this could not have happened.
A. Sources said that they did not return.

Q. But you said that the wives and daughters were raped and no such things happened. I mean, what I want to know, what is your source?
A. Source.

Q. No. No. I want to …
A. Because those people, the concerned officers and the women raped, they told. It is given here .. It is pathetic.

Q. So this is from your book? It comes from your book!
A. It is not that I cannot make any mistake.

Q. Then you sometimes feel that there were certain mistakes committed.
A. Yes, I say, yes. You know every Hindu is a Shivaji. [They would] try to eliminate us . It is not also difficult for them to eliminate you. Due to them we all were isolated. We get together, we had been forced ….

Q. When did you first contact the Indians?
A. On the 14th…

Q. 14th December. Not before 14th December?
A. And that was through the Americans, … when Aurora had warned, I had three or four divisions. And when they came they were Jacob and Colonel Khara. And Khara was Sikh from Risalpur— his ancestor became Mussalman during the reign of Mughal Emperors in India. So he came and met me and he said, how many troops you have got? The signal was clear. I said, we [have] got 9 battalions. I said you are
Sikh, you should be available as Sikh. I have 9 battalions with 10 thousand men. I can fight you one man, two man but not 10 thousand men. He told me, you are going to Fort William.

Q. When was this?
A. When he came. We surrendered and went to Calcutta on the 20th or something like 21st December.

Q. Were you interrogated as Prisoner of War?
A. No. General …

Q. But Rao Farman Ali, in his book…
A. He might have [written]… not me…

Q. But you have no knowledge of it?
A. No, they got me and had given me to the officers of India. Then I went farther. When you are away from here one could have leaked you what I have not told here.

Q. Could you please tell us what was your feeling on 16th December 1971?
A. Oh! That was the day we were surrendering…

Q. It was surrendering, according to you, to the Hindus.
A. I..I was that day … I was silent that day, helpless! See, the Army is practically like a horse. The same army under Yaqub had nothing to do, same Army under Tikka started killing people, the same Army afterwards, under me, fought after it was practically a fatigued horse. It behaved like the rider. If the rider is not a good rider, then it kicks. If the rider is good enough, it runs fast. Have you seen shikari kuttas(hunting dogs) to be let call shikar(game)? There is some sort of fun to open the door. Same is the case with the Army. Which way the shikari should lead he should know, he should know how and when he should release the bird from his closed fist, where he will lead [the] bulldog ….

Q. How many people were killed, you think, during this time, I mean, from April to December?
A. Our account is 30 thousand killed.

Q. What about the civilians?
A. It was 50 thousand on the night Tikka took action.

Q. And during the rest of the period?
A. Up to that time [there] were not much.

Q. I mean what could be your official record? …were you not maintaining any record?
A. Yes it is mentioned. We collected it. We had to send situation report. And in it we
had so many wounded, so many …

Q. No, this is during the war. War was declared on the night of 3rd December.
A. 21st November. They attacked us. On that day we had 13 thousand [troops].

Q. But they had complete superiority. There was no question of frontal. Basically …
A. Mukti Bahini's casualty is given here as 30 thousand.

Q. No. I am talking about the civilian population.
A. No. We have no account of that. I never fought civilians.

Q. Are you aware that the Razakars, Al-Badar, Al-Shams— they were involved in large-scale killing?
A. No. I had 38 thousand troops. They were getting killed. So I used them to make up [for the] the deficiency. I gave those Al-Badars, Al-Shams to the divisions. They were using them for their own thing. And that they broke and got away and did something, nobody could check that. But they were put under the religion and they were being used…. They were sent to field. So it will take time to confirm. And then they were given weapons.

Q. And do you have any remorse on the overall situation?
A. Somebody got inducted as proposed, and then someone also came…we could have broken India if we were allowed to go ahead. India would have forgotten ….

Q. What about the action taken in Bangladesh?
A. It was wrong. The action on 25th or 26th was wrong. But there was report that Mujib was to take action that night. We were to counter that.

Q. Do you believe Mujib was going to do that?
A. Yes, he was flying high about it. He was hard. And as I said, had Yaqub controlled them, nothing would have happened. If Yaqub had done it properly and as I said had Yaqub controlled [them] then nothing would have happened. If Yaqub had done it properly, Tikka would not have come, action would not have taken, I would not have gone there, everything would have been okay there. If Mujib was given the power [that was] taken away, then things would not have happened. It was not proper not to give him power when he won the election. He could have been given the power. It was Bhutto [who] opposed [it]. He said he should not be given the power that he deserved.

Q. You have dedicated your book to the Razakars, not to soldiers, why?
A. Ours had been the duty and we were being paid but they came voluntarily!*


More on Niazi in Wikipedia

Interview of Major General Rao Farman Ali AKA "The Butcher of Bengal"

Abridged and edited version of the Interview of Rao Farman Ali taken by Prof. Muntassir Mamoon and Mahiuddin Ahmed, published in the book titled The vanquished generals and the liberation war of Bangladesh

---------------------------------

MAHIUDDIN AHMED: We would like to ask you, General Rao Farman Ali, how you initially got involved you in the operation in East Pakistan?

RAO FARMAN ALI: I was posted to East Pakistan in1967 as Commander... 14th Battalion ... after the Martial Law was declared ...General Yahia took over. Just before that I had completed 2 years and I was sent back to West Pakistan, but as Martial Law had been declared I had some experience of the East Pakistan situation, they wanted me back and I was posted back within 10 days of stay in West Pakistan. When I reached there General Muzaffaruddin was the GOC, he was acting as Governor and I was posted there as Deputy Marshal Law Administrator for several years. It's a very difficult thing to explain to an outsider that within Martial Law there were branches which were practically operating independently and doing their own job under one man, the Martial Law Administrator.

Q. You were in charge of the civil affairs?

A. Civil affairs, right. Every file, which started... from secretariat, it came to the Governor's house. I was there, the file went through me to the Governor. Normally it was a complete file; there was nothing I could do. At times, I may have asked a few questions, as a normal officer of that level, to raise queries to the General who was acting as a Governor. His task was commanding... and therefore a lot of responsibilities depended on me.

Q. Was your job concerning national security, the security of the people?
A. No, I was not dealing with the national security in the sense of power game. I was dealing with national security in the sense that the nation [had to] stay together and it would be the nation's security. That means I looked after the political aspect of every action that was being taken in East Pakistan.... for example, in those days, the students had actually taken over politics before the Martial Law. During Field Marshal's days, as I explained, all political parties had been banned. They were not operating, so samebody had to take over as a natural consequence of the situation, and the students took over the political side. Now I had to deal with the students side.


Q. What was your agenda, basically, while dealing with the students?
A. The agenda was to win over as may people as possible in the student community and the labour community also. I spent a lot of time in putting the administration right. Why do people agitate? Because things are not going right form the administration's side and there is frustration and that frustration leads to agitation. Before Martial Law, those had to be put right and I met the people, I met students, I met labor leaders.


Q. Who do you think were responsible for those problems at that time?
A. Well, it is a very complicated problem. If you take labour, population is a problem; you could not give jobs [to] everybody. Unless... developing your country economically, the labour will agitate. As far the students are concerned, as I said, they came into politics, and they virtually had the control over Dhaka University. They did whatever they wanted; I suppose you were also there. So a police was not allowed to go into hostels, not only hostel but also into the University.

Q. So, It was an important posting, I mean, it was because you were close to Yahya Khan?
A. No, actually ... he did not know much about me because I never drink I [have] never touched drink. No I was not in that group. Secondly I was too junior. My promotion took place very rapidly and I became a General before six other persons become Generals later on.


Q. So, you were basically in the Martial Law culture. I mean, if you are talking about democracy and rule of law, you are talking about the majority ruling, in that case the population which had the majority would find the highest number of seats, so...
A. Yes, this is what I have in the end come to know or at least realis that East Pakistanis were in majority. I suppose when I was here, one did not even think of these things. But when I started dealing with the situation then my whole perception changed. Before that I was just an administrator— things come to you, you give a decision. But later as things went on as you saw what was happening. For example I delivered a speech when a branch of National Bank of Pakistan was being opened in Dhaka Cantonment and in that I thought that, East Pakistanis were being influenced by the "Hindus". I did not know that there was a Hindu leader sitting there.


Q. In your book, you also...
A. That, I did not even realize that there the society is quite mixed up.

Q. In your book you also mentioned that it is generally believed that Tajuddin Ahmed's... family was...
A. No, well, Tajuddin was anti-Pakistani. Mujib was not anti-Pakistani, Khandker Mustaque was not anti-Pakistani.


Q. You mean Tajuddin was pro-Bangladeshi or pro-Bangali?
A. No, there is a difference, you could be pro-Bengali, and everybody should have been pro-Bengali, all Bengali should be Pro-Bengali, the difference was that he wanted to break off Pakistan, the others did not want to break off Pakistan.


Q. Right, so...
A. So, my feelings against Tajuddin were stronger than [those against] the others, the others were on the right side.


Q. Then my question would be that were not the Bengalis who proposed, who formed Muslim league, were not the Bengalis who proposed the 1947...
A. Actually I wanted to start with that and in my book also I have said that 95% Muslims of East Pakistan voted for Pakistan. It was the East Pakistanis who created Pakistan. So the creation of Pakistan was not imposed by West Pakistan on East Pakistan, it was the interest of East Pakistan to preserve Pakistan.

Q. That's it
A. Is not it?

Q. Except when the...
A. Except when they thought that perhaps the West Pakistanis were not fair to them, that they were not giving [them] their rights. In that, I am with them that they were right in asking for their right, but in their effort to break off Pakistan, I think they were not right because Pakistan was a necessity felt throughout Pakistan movement by East Pakistanis more than by West Pakistanis. The Pakistanis who were living in West Pakistan did not create Pakistan.


Q. Do you think the feeling for Pakistan was being exploited over the just feeling of the Bengalis? Because the ruling elite which was... in the army, they became the contractors of Pakistan. They decided how to run Pakistan, so in that power structure there was no room for the Bengalis. So I mean, was it unjustified?
A. No, absolutely right, they were right. Even then I said that they had the right, if they are in majority they should be given the power, this was my stand and continue to be my stand. May I explain that the difference between two is this, it was right for any people of any area ask for their own rights, but it was not right to break off what they had created themselves.


Q. True.
A. I can say that Pakistan was not broken by East Pakistanis, it was broken by West Pakistanis but the fact is it was broken by the mistakes which both sides made. East Pakistan made some mistakes, West Pakistanis made mistakes. The Central Government of Pakistan was responsible for doing things which were not right for the maintenance of Pakistan and for keeping Pakistan together. Now I hope the distinction which I have drawn is clear.

Q. What's your opinion about the Six Points?
A. Yes, [Mujib] said that he will modify the Six Points and he will [make it] flexible. These are not Quranic laws, the Six Points is not from heaven and also we knew that within the Awami League there were people who had differences on Six Points and on the perception of Six Points. If Mujib had [fewer] number of votes, he would have had [a] more reasonable chance of getting things done in the manner he wanted, having such a heavy mandate that only two votes were against him he became a prisoner in the hands of demanders [of the Six Point]. He had to then support the Six Points. It became a case of do and die, which should not have been when you are discussing politics. Now, at the same time I hope you will keep in mind what I said against Bhutto. My dealing with the situations would be sort of neutral. I tried to hold a meeting and say you get together. Who are they? They were also East Pakistanis; they were not from West Pakistan.

Q. You mean the rightists, Mr. Nurul Amin? Golam Azam?
A. They were all East Pakistanis. We would have found a solution. [If] Mujib did not have all the ... seats we would have been able to put pressure on him.


Q. So, now that Bangabandhu Seikh Mujibru Rahman won, I mean the Awami League won the majority, don't you think it was the duty of the Government to hand over power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman?
A. No doubt.


Q. Then what happened?
A. No, as far I was concerned, I will explain that I wanted him to be Prime Minister, and even after [the] war when Mujib was ... in the jail and somebody, some other person tried to become the Prime Minister, I told that to General Yahya. I think immediately after the election, the situation should have developed by reconciliation of the different points. Instead of reconciliation confrontation took place. Now there was a tremendous amount of doubt in the minds of each other. Sheikh Mujib did not trust Bhutto, Bhutto did not trust Sheikh Mujib, Sheikh Mujib, himself told me, I think I have written in my book that, that night when I went to see him, after Bhutto's rejection happened..., I asked him, what happened between [the] two of you?


Q. Were you aware of the so-called Larkana plan? When did you think this was developing?
A. I was not aware of it. General Umar told me [a] little bit about it, because in my book I have written only what I knew directly.


Q. Right, what did General Umar tell you later on?
A. He told me that after the President came back from Dhaka where he had declared that Mujib would be the next Prime Minister of Pakistan, they went to Larkana and in Larkana, Bhutto said that you had made Mujib the Prime Minister, he said I have not, people had made him the Prime Minister, and he said that after some little bit of talk he told him that Mujib's patriotism should be tested, the test should be postponement of the National Assembly session. If he reacts, he is not a patriot and if he accepts it then he is [a] patriot and in my book I think I have said that if the reverse side had been tested what would have happened, now these things I have said that time in meeting with the President and-


Q. What was his reaction?
A. See, when you are dealing with the....


Q. Intelligence?
A. Or politics, there are many pressures and the pressure of the Generals was so great on him that he literally told me, I [am] going [to] West Pakistan. But the main reason was Bhutto wanted to be the Prime Minister and here was only one country. They had to had to have two countries to have two Prime Ministers. He has suggested two Prime Ministerships to an American journalist and then he denied it.


Q. Who? Mr. Bhutto?
A. Mr. Bhutto. Then he denied it. This was quite early but this was his feeling. Now, as I was saying, instead of reconciliation, confrontation started. Mujib made a statement, Bhutto made another statement and this went on one after the other. Mujib had no compulsion, being very aggressive because he had the majority. A normal politician that would not have done but he [Bhutto] did. Any those old Muslim [League] leaders, could have accepted Mujib, things would have been finished. But he wanted to keep his own party alive. Without giving your own party something for the struggle, the party is likely to breakup if he is not aggressive. And in that aggressiveness he went too far and when he made those statements that 'Hum Edher Tum Udher. "I will break up every body" all those things.


Q. So, the talks were desired to fail any way, is it how you interpret the situation?
A. As far as Yahya was concerned, he reached for the first talks on 16th March, I think, and we met and there were two persons I.... and Air Force Officer Masud and... hero of 65 war and except the two of us nobody spoke in that meeting. General Shah Ali said something, he was being stopped. I said Sir, this is not right to follow a policy that would encourage East Pakistan to go away from us. You know, one does not use [such] words, say break up.


Q. You want to suggest superstitions?
A. And he said that the Father of the Nation was quite willing to accept Mr. Suhrawardi's suggestion. From that we were quite clear that he was going to accept a compromise, and he and Bhutto ... Mujib... I think [came] to some sort of solution. I rang up Mujib on the 19th in the evening and said "Bhai kuch hua?" You see, we were on friendly terms. He said, yes, I will be the Prime Minister, there will be few ministers from Punjab, five from East. I said I was quite happy. Next morning Mr. Bhutto was there and he broke up every thing.


Q. That was on the 20th of March?
A. Yes, he said that you cannot lift Martial Law because there will be no law to keep the Federation together. There was no constitution, Next November same year, just before Indian attack I saw Yahya in Lahore and the People's Party stated that he should hand over power under a Martial Law order to the Pakistan People's Party. I said, see how they have changed, could not this be done a year ago? Now in my opinion in East Pakistan I had conversations with many people. They thought they could live independently as Singapore. In East Pakistan also they had the American Ambassador in India. He had suggested that if East Pakistanis threw away West Pakistan this will be more economically viable. So people stopped thinking rationally, there was too much of emotion involved and I have also said in my book that there was a time when somebody said that we will not allow this bastard to rule over us. I said if they are bastards, we are bastards to them. There were some people in West Pakistan who thought of East Pakistan as a colony.


Q. Yes, it was a liability!
A. Why do we say we have lost East Pakistan? See that... East Pakistan has lost West Pakistan, actually they were [the] majority.


Q. General, we are going to ask you about the 25th of March, 24th, and 26th. Now, when was it planned to go for Operation Searchlight and why was it planned?
A. Actually, on the 19th. As I said, after the meeting ... I was satisfied, but on the 20th we started feeling in our offices that there were certain things going wrong, and 25th, I think it is Bangladesh day or what ever it was.


Q. 23rd-Pakistan Day, Republic Day.
A. On 23rd, Pakistan Day the I think, Mujib came with a flag, Bangladesh flag, to meet the President, and there was a parade in front of his house. There he took the salute, [it can be said] declaring Bangladesh. Now, even then, at least in our head office we had not much information. At the President's house at their own negotiations, I think the President, Mr. Pirzada, Colonel Elias, Mr. Ahmad, Mr. Hamid, one or two others were keeping everything secret, so I and the GOC still stayed outside without a job at that time because we had come out of the Governor house... and General Khadem Hossain Raja was appointed as commander. We asked General Tikka to go and find out what was happening, because we were totally in the dark because something was not right. So, he went there and he came back and he said that there was something wrong, the negotiation was not going well so something should be done to re-establish the control of the Government. What had happened was that we had to go back. As soon as the date was changed, announcement was made, there was hesitation in Dhaka and there were killings, from what we heard of people in Nawabganj, Old Dhaka, and Army moved in, There was a big rally and in that it was announced by Mujib that Government will be run by the Awami League. Mr. Tajuddin became virtually the Prime minister, he issued direction to the bank, to everybody.The army was confined to the barracks, they could not go even out of the cantonments limits. There was nothing which we could buy from bazaar, no contractor would supply even the vegetables.


Q. Army was not flown from West Pakistan?
A. On the 26th.


Q. Before 26th, when the army was flown in, there were 90 lakh army-
A. No, that is a separate question. It gradually built up. 26th was the day when the first battalion arrived there, after the 25th-


Q. So, could you tell us elaborately the planning of "Operation Searchlight".
A. Now this had developed over a period of time as to what type of operation will be successful. Now, in Amritsar, for example, the Indian army attacked and they used tanks, mortars, whatever they could, except aircraft and they overcame the opposition. When an army was launched as an army, not as civil affairs, it succeeds or it tries to succeed. Over a period of time the curfews had lost their effectiveness.

Martial Law had lost it effectiveness, and nobody obeyed the Martial Law. The Government was finished in East Pakistan.... We did not consider the emotional side which I think was wrong, we did not realize the troops, feeling. What ... was happening was that they were beaten up in many places, officers were insulted, they could not go out, and emotions were charged. Here we are, troops of a Government, and we cannot even get meat. Our plan was quite simple, that we will impose curfew and that we will go and arrest the leaders.


Q. But you said earlier that on the 19th Mr. Bhutto told you that things were settled.
A. No, Mr. Mujib, not Bhutto.


Q. Bhutto agreed to settle?
A. No, he had not agreed, Yahya Khan agreed, Bhutto had not agreed, Bhutto came and-


Q. On his suggestion?
A. Well, suppose so, because I met Bhutto when I came back to Pakistan. I had never met him before, when I was in East Pakistan he was too big to meet a Brigadier. So what I was saying was that they were emotionally charged. On the second day the citizens of Dhaka, I would say, were better prepared. They were prepared for it from the 7th till the 25th. They had the police into them, they had all the Rajakars, and Mujahids, Ansar, everything. They were all under the command of the Government at that time. It was not a declared Government, but had the authority and it was just to go in and occupy the television, radio, the stations. The houses of leaders had been marked. Such a search plan had been shown to troops and they were to be arrested so that no commotion happened. However at about 10 O'clock Yahya left. So after sunset, it was still [a] little bit dark when he in his small car came to the airport and took off on the 25th. But you know, he did not know that Mr. Khandker, Air Vice Marshal, came later on . He was at the airport and informed Mujib. At that time, the
Awami League was holding a meeting in Mujib's house and we thought we will go and arrest them, it will be easy and simple.When these talks were going on I gave a paper to Siddiq Salek, the PRO, who was going to President house. He was the Liaison Officer. In the paper I suggested that two prompt startegies be adopted, You have to have force, but you must have a political solution, attest to that and [the] political solution [that] I suggested [was] that as soon as we arrested these people, the President should go there and declare that the eight points of the Pakistan People's Party will be accepted instead of Six Points. You know, virtually they were the same, except that one was too aggressive, the other was too mild but achieving [the] same provisional autonomy for East Pakistan. So when the discussions were taking place in the Martial Law Head Quarter as to what to do with Mujib I suggested that he should not be killed because the SAG was going to raid the house. I said that he should be taken in custody and that [will] separat him from the extremist— not from the people, but those who wanted independence. This suggestion's first part that Mujib not be killed was accepted, but the second part that he should announce a political solution simultaneously was not accepted. I do not think the President gave any thought to it because he was flying to West Pakistan the same night. This was now personal and the GOC and I were isolated and harassed. We visited our wives. We also went to General Hamid and General Khadem's place. Well, they said that we were afraid of taking military action. Both of us were against military action, Khadem and I. So, they told our wives, we do not want to take military action and I said that Sir I am not worried about my life, I am worried about Pakistan because it would not stay after this. Somebody can ask why did you take part in this? Now as an army officer we cannot resign. Shahebjada Yakub resigned and he was declared "Yellow" and for a very long time he was in the clouds, even now there are people who think that he was a coward. Which he was not, he had his conviction. But what we considered was that I am giving an order to attack a position in actual war and I know that I will be killed. [Knowing] that troops will be killed, I ... still attack, because I have been ordered.


Q. There is a code in the army- you can defy if it is a mad order?
A. No, not in that sense.


Q. I mean, I have seen the war crime trials, they said you can choose not to execute a 'mad order'.
A. This came out of the war crimes, this is the opinion of the learned judges that one should... did any General of German army...


Q. Not the German army, such a plea was accepted by a tribunal.
A. May be, but it is not normal that the Generals would resign if they are told to do certain things. It is not done in the Pakistan army. In any case I was not the GOC.


Q. I think General Niazi has written that Tikka Khan ordered that the Pakistan army be more merciless than the massacre at Bukhara... by Chengis Khan and Halaku Khan and he said I want the land not the people and he said that General Rao Farman Ali matchlessly followed that order and in your diary you wrote that the green land of East Pakistan will be painted red.
A. There are two different things. General Niazi, I am sorry to say, is a liar. Let us discuss the green of East Pakistan be painted red first.


Q. I think, you have explained that in your book also.
A. You can ask Jafar, Kazi Jafar, whether he delivered a speech in Tongi or not. He delivered [the] speech meaning that we would convert [the] East Pakistan Islamic concept into Communism. General Yaqub rang me up and I wrote it down.


Q. What is your opinion about Niazi's book?
A. He has tried to defend his own position by accusing others, I would not like to say more than that. Because this is total lie. You know, he has not written the book. You ask him now to write one page then I will accept that he has written the book. The people are not together and they have written this book in whatever manner they wanted. General Tikka never said these things. I think that he is a very fine person. He is a poor chap, he has been blamed for the butchery of Baluchistan, butchery of East Pakistan. If you meet him you will see that he is a very fine person.


Q. You ask us to meet him?
A. He is not well, he is terribly sick, very old.


Q. What did Niazi say?
A. Well, Niazi said clearly that on the first day when he took over he had his chair turned round. He sat on that and he said what I am hearing about Russia, we are in enemy territory. In Burma we used to get rations from the land. We could get cattle instead, though they were limited. So he was one, who said [we were in] enemy territory. We never thought that was an enemy territory, this was Pakistan. He also said terrible things, that we should change the race. He was a clever person. He may show you the orders. Somebody wrote it for him and he signed it. But this execution was terrible.


Q. Can you elaborate on the formation of the civil armed forces saying that you formed the Razakars?
A. I think it had been formed by the Martial Law Head Quarter.


Q. Whose brainchild was the Force?
A. Must have been the Core Commandant's.


Q. Who was at that time?
A. Niazi.


Q. His book is also dedicated to them.
A. He created them and he used them, which I suppose anybody else also would have done.


Q. As far as danger was concern it was a war situation. In the book he said that the leaders of Al-Badar and Al-Shams were brought back along with the prisoners of war (POW).
A. I do not know.


Q. You have no knowledge?
A. You see what happened was [that] there was a break in my authority. On the 13th I think, the Governor resigned. I was in the Governor House. The Indians attacked, and the Governor resigned, Malik. After that, I have no job. I am nobody.


Q. This is on the 13th (December 1971). So on 13th and 14th the intellectuals were...
A. Yes may be, intellectuals, there you are. They are all blaming me for being...


Q. Western media and the independent international media hold you responsible, why?
A. As a person I do not know why, because I was the only one...


Q. They have shown a lot of evidence. Nobody has refuted that so far.
A. I have not seen international media...


Q. Killing of intellectuals actually started in October, because in Dhaka near Notre Dame [College] a doctor was killed. I mean it started earlier and 14th December saw culmination of the killing. That's one thing. Second is you were in charge of civil administration. General Niazi was looking after the front.
A. No, he was Martial Law Administrator.


Q. You were in charge of civil administration and the political leaders say Golam Azam, Moulana Mannan, they had connections with you. They used to meet you, take advice, and may have executed those things. So it's logical that nothing could happen without your knowledge. Do you agree with it?
A. Why?


Q. Because you are the...
A. By nothing means killing?


Q. It includes everything in administration.
A. No, see what happened [was] that after the military action things changed. The Martial Law acted as last force. The Governor House did not have any stand of its own because Governor House only controlled the civil secretariat, all the police and all the Razakars. All the army, civil armed forces were under the Martial law Administrator. And the core commander not even under me.


Q. So General Niazi was responsible for that?
A. General Niazi was responsible for law and order.


Q. Legacy speaks that...
A. Absolutely. I tell you, on the 9th December, I was called by General Jansher who was in Pilkhana, Civil Armed Forces, and EPR. He said that we have to go and see General Niazi. Generally I had never had a meeting with General Niazi. So I said all right we will go, situation is bad. I went to Pilkhana. It was dark slightly. I saw certain vehicles standing there and I ask him why these vehicles are standing here? He said we are going to see General Niazi for certain purpose and these cars are here for that purpose. On the way he told me that certain number of the people are to be arrested. So I said why? He said you ask Niazi. We went to his office and there Niazi said, what is you is opinion? I said Sir, this is not the time to arrest anybody, and you have to account for whoever is with you.


Q. Which date was this?
A. This was the 9th of December, just before surrender. 9th or 10th. And they should not be arrested. The question does not arise. He said alright, they would not be arrested. I came back. And on the morning of 16th or 17th, I was called by the Indian General O.R Tagore and he said that these people were killed by your orders. I said how could I execute my orders! Whom did I give my orders? Can I go alone and kill those people? I had no troops.


Q. Who were these people?
A. All the intellectuals …..


Q. After the liberation, I mean, in Bangladesh, in the Governor House there were some written documents in which the names of intellectuals killed were written by you.
A. Not by me. There were lots of people who used to come and see me. And they would give me a list, I never …..


Q. For what reasons?
A. No these were anti-Pakistanis. Though I accepted those things I would take no action on those. And the same lists would be given to the Core Commanders. Some people used to attain here and there.


Q. You lost your war against the independent media.
A. Please tell me, is it possible for one individual on the night of 16th December …


Q. No, no this was done on the night of 13th and 14th December.
A. No. I will tell you about which General Niazi has also said. I think he was the BBC Representative, may be. No, no, what happened was that on the 7th December BBC announced that General Niazi has run away and General Farman has taken over. But this was not possible because I was junior. I was rung up by Corps Headquarters saying that you go [ check ] on this fellow that he should not publish or get such stories published. So I rang him up. He had perhaps a recorder. And the people do not know that I am of the Army but two separate things I used to do. I had no regard as such for executing the orders of the Army. I was not under them. I only said in my effort to help you 'ke bhai, dekhiye army may take some severe action against you. So don't send such stories'. So that has been used against me by the international media. He has not only done this but he had also warned him. I was afraid now of what had happened. There was ex-Secretary in the government, with the Governor, Hussain. He came to me. What he said was that people were being arrested, can you save me? I said, who is arresting. He said that people were being arrested and I have no knowledge. See, the Army had its own jail. We in the Governor house had no knowledge that they had a jail. But it was for crimes which Army said are being committed by them. Otherwise, as far as intellectuals are concerned how would I be there going round and meeting intellectuals.


Q. General Niazi claims also …. And you know that your book came before and General Niazi's book came afterwards. Now he squarely puts his blame on you. And you will have to write another book to .. I mean, explain.
A. But I think that also, what happened was that while I was in India, the Indian Army was quite willing to try me through something against me. They had arrested 50 people, taken them from the EPR (East Pakistan Rifles). Among them was General, that is, Brigadier Bashir and gave them an offer that whoever gives evidence against General Farman would be sent first to their home in West Pakistan. And it is to their credit that one man came up and said, General Farman had not done anything wrong. Now I claim that I did nothing wrong. I did try to first preserve Pakistan without killing anybody. If some, even one man, can be claimed to have been killed by me, you can hang me. And I made this offer in Jabbalpore to the MIRCP: please take me to Dhaka and let me meet Mujib for 5 minutes and after that if he does not embrace me then you can do whatever you like.


Q. What is this MIRCP?
A. That was International Red Cross.


Q. I see.
A. In Jabbalpore, the Deputy DDMI - the Indian Army, Leslie, he came and interviewed [me]. He said, General Farman, you are accused of having killed two hundred people in the last………….


Q. You say so in details in your book about various interrogations. Niazi was also interrogated?
A. He is sitting there. Go and ask him : Did I oppose the arrest of those people or not? If I opposed the arrest would I be killing them? In any case, what did I have? Troops? I had no troops. There was police to be used.


Q. No. It is alleged to have been done by the Al-Badar and Al-Shams.
A. No. No. I had no control.


Q. You had no control over the Razakars?
A. It was done by the Martial Law Headquarters.


Q. The development was done by the Martial Law Headquarters?
A. The development, if at all, was by General Niazi. I had good relations with, I think, most of the Awami League people. But as they had gone to Calcutta, my time was mostly spent on keeping in touch with a large number of people who were still in East Pakistan and I think they were 42 or 43 people. And I was also trying to contact MNAs ….


Q. There was the new batch of MNA's because you held an election.
A. Well, that came very late. I think we can discuss it after it has been cleared. Yes, you can take my word.


Q. No. That's alright.
A. No. No. Because you see that there have been suggestions.


Q. But again I mean, during the 9 months did you know that Pakistan Army was killing many people, raping many women, killing children. It was happening with knowledge [of the] Pakistan Army. From March to December 16.
A. Yes. And I tried to take action. I told General Hamid, the Chief of Army Staff. I gave him names of individuals who have been killed by the Army after they were taken into custody. The names were I think, Saidur Rahman... [Saidul Hasan]


Q. I am not saying that the Army did not take into custody one or two people or killed one or two people. I mean the numbers were much higher... it was genocide.
A. This is wrong. I don't accept it was genocide. How do you define genocide n the military term? Genocide is when you start killing people without any reason.


Q. That means no fighting is happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
A. That is genocide.


Q. So ethnic cleansing is as bad as 'Nustle badla dena'.
A. Wuo to khair hoga. But I don't think he executed that. I don't know. But I think he did not. He was just using his tongue loosely. But I don't think there was whenever it was possible. Martial Law was the culmination of break down of the civil administration. And so Martial Law comes in. When Martial Law had failed that means us - myself and the Governor - we had failed. Then, the Army had taken over.
And it was the Army rule which was in existence for 9 months in East Pakistan, not the Governor's rule.


Q. I mean you call it genocide what was happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then why should not your action in East Pakistan be termed as genocide.
A. No. I claim not. So many people were killed.


Q. Then all the international press was wrong?
A. The international press as only …..


Q. And only you and those who were in Dhaka.
A. No. No. Nei. Nei, that is not true. We, those who were in Dhaka, said it was not genocide. Genocide is done with an intention that you want to kill people. And as far as we are concerned, you see, we were separate from the Army.

Q. But what I am asking - did you know these things were happening in the then East Pakistan?
A. Not at that scale as you see. Because ....

Q. Forget about it.
A. This is my opinion....

Q. Is the international press which had reported these things?
A. Yes, international press was annoyed because Yahya threw them out which was wrong and the international press were then …


Q. Actually they were not thrown out but they came back and they reported in details with photographs. With photographs and everything. I mean, you - you have the knowledge of hindsight. Even if, you know, one is prepared to accept your point of view that you were not in any way responsible for killing of even 1 percent and you said that very clearly, then somebody has, don't you see? I mean, is it not clear now?
A. The reason, no. One must ...accept this that under what circumstances whoever exceed the limit of the rules of the Army, he is responsible, but circumstances should also be seen.

Q. The reason, you see, if General Niazi was fighting a war and if it was really a war situation, I mean then one can understand that these things happen in war. But the point, I mean, you clearly said that. He said, he claimed to be in the enemy territory. Obviously, you know he was fighting a war. I mean, even if these were accepted, you see, the killings of such a large scale, I mean, I can't believe as an active General at that time you were not aware of ….
A. No. I don't accept the figure of 2 millions.


Q. No. No. We are not debating….
A. 40 to 50 thousands.

Q. Do you not consider the 40-50 thousand is also a large number?
A. No. This is….

Q. Army killed innocent people.
A. Yes. It was a very large number. It is a very large number. I agree it was a large number. At the same time see what happened between the 7th and the 25th March, what a large number of people who can be identified were killed. We had in East Pakistan Rifles NCO's who were of West Pakistani origin, they were all killed. The JCO's in the East Bengal Regiment were killed, troops were surrounded in Patna…. What is the …. Pabna, Pabna… they were all massacred.


Q. This one particular reference which General Niazi makes of 2000 officers were killed. I mean, what is your opinion on that?
A. Not army officers.


Q. Army officers and their families. But it was not reported in the press - Pakistani Press and in the international press?
A. 2000….


Q. Yes. Two or three thousands …like these! Between the 7th and 25th March all the West Pakistani Army Officers were killed and their wives were killed and raped.
A. I tell you, I know the army officers who were killed. Two army officers were killed in Dhaka area— the Commandant of the Cadet College and the Central Commandant Janjua. He was killed and his wife was taken away. The one woman - one of the wives of the officers was pregnant and the child was taken out of her body. But these were certain things. In Bogra there was a small ammunition depot and there was a Major in charge who was killed and they played football with his head while his wife was made to stand up there. Between the 7th and the 25th a large number of Biharis were killed. In Syedpur, I am talking about Keya naam hai— but a large number of Biharis were killed. 800 dead bodies were found. …..Woman and children were killed and their men were thrown in the river. But a West Pakistani and Assistant Commissioner, son-in-law of Intelligence Bureau Chief had been dragged in Tangail and two officers were killed in Jessore area.


Q. I mean, in a way it was revenge killing?
A. No. No. It was between 5th to 23rd when they had taken over. There was nothing
before that.


Q. But why it was not reported in the Pakistan newspapers and in the East Pakistani newspapers because at that time we read newspapers avidly and newspapers from both West and East Pakistan.
A. But Mr Bhasani made a statement against the killing in Chittagong. Whether it was fact or not that all the railway officials in Chittagong were killed?


Q. After 25th March?
A. No. Before 25th March.

Q. No. I mean they were killed before that ….. Well, whatever had happened, do you have any remorse on the situation.
A. Yes, I had remorse then, I even have it here. One day I saw three people. The wife of the Deputy Commissioner, Comilla, a delegation from the Bihari women and a delegation from the West Pakistani officers and I was crying because East Pakistanis or West Pakistanis were the same.


Q. The entire period, I mean, in this period of your action, the action of the army ….
A. This was very tragic. It should not have happened.

Q. Do you feel any personal remorse?
A. In not doing what I could do.

Q. Only doing what you should not have done.
A. No. I am doing but whatever I did was to the best of my ability and conscience and I think that I have no remorse about that. But I have a feeling I could have resigned. I did resign. You can ask General Yaqub but he said that you then will be court martialled.

Q. You have any message for the people of Bangladesh?
A. Well they are, I … you see, I am a Pakistani. If the creation of Pakistan was right, preservation of Pakistan was also right. If Pakistan had not come into being, Bangladesh would have never come into being.

Q. Niazi has written in his book that actually you are the man responsible for Niazi's down fall. I mean he did not want to surrender but you engineered everything.
A. With the …. Russians, that was not possible. This will be the first time in history, wherein I was a civilian who made a General surrender.


Q. Then why did you draft the surrender instrument?
A. I didn't.

Q. The message you sent to the United Nations.
A. Yes, this was drafted by Muzaffar Hussain, the Chief Secretary of East Pakistan at that time and the Governor …. It was drafted by them. Muzaffar and I both went to General Niazi and we said that the Central Government had sent a message saying you can do what you like in East Pakistan. Before that General Niazi's 2 signals, has he quoted those signals which he sent to West Pakistan? He says, I can fight on.

Q. I think they are reported in General Gul Hassan's book.
A. He can say that I can fight for say 2 days or a couple of days more. Now if [it] was shown that you can only fight for couple of days more then why blame me? I was trying to ensure that there is no surrender, that a cease-fire takes place, a cease fire is much better. The Indians had cease fire in Kashmir, they are still there. We could have a cease fire….

Q. No. I mean attempts were made to have a cease fire when Mr. Bhutto went to the United Nations.
A. No.He did not. He also tore up [The chances]. Otherwise a ceasefire could have taken place-we could have sat together and got a decision to form a government by the elected representatives of East Pakistan in Dhaka. Now what is wrong with that ... why not have a Government by the representatives of East Pakistan. Now, in my opinion if we had a cease fire there would have been no surrender, there would have been no humiliation and what had happened and East Pakistan and West Pakistan could have sat together. And after that there could have been a solution. Now I don't know, this is my feeling as soon as the Indian Army entered Dhaka, entered East Pakistan, the mood of the people of East Pakistan changed, you may recollect ...[it] influenced you as well, that we are changing one Army ... we are changing Pakistan Army with Indian Army.

Q. No. No. Not at all because we were happy that they helped us to fight the Pakistani Army because they were doing such terrible things. We were at that time in Dhaka because you see worst things were happening. So we had a different feeling. You were in power. So you had a feeling different from us. I know that will be different. But the point is, you know, recently in the Pakistani newspapers the debate is going on. Somebody is writing that Pakistan Government should apologize for what they did in Bangladesh. What's your reaction please.
A. Well, I think, it should be ….


Q. Which one, may I ask a question?
A. Both sides made mistakes.


Q. So your inference is : Both sides made mistakes?
A. Both sides made mistakes. There were three phases of developments in East Pakistan. Phase- 1, West Pakistan was totally wrong in considering East Pakistan as a colony; not giving the power, not giving them share in powers; Phase-II when the agitation started, it started in a manner which was more aggressive than that it should have been and then the Pakistan Army made mistakes of launching the army to reestablish……


Q. Who should start the process?
A. First of all we should decide on whether our perception of Muslims of Pakistan, that means, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India is the same as [it] used to be in the olden days.

Q. It can't be; I don't think it is possible. I mean, you can't have that perception now.
A. No. By that I mean do we all feel together, that though we made mistakes we are still under the same danger as it existed before Pakistan came into being, that if we have [a] feeling that we should be closer to each other. We can not be one: we cannot be one state. In any case, my own opinion was that Mr. Suhrawardy may have been right. But Bangladesh could not have survived because it did not have the administrative structures and …. If you feel that the Hindus [have the] mentality of considering us Malichch (Mlechcha), the lowest cast, and would treat us in the same manner as they did in the past then a feeling could have been developed in East and West Pakistan that it is in our mutual interest to get together. It is very difficult, very difficult for one side, it is a question of political language which is to be used. But state apology, I think the West Pakistanis may not be able to give, may not be able to give it if it was a question of by saying so. I can say, I am sorry, please forgive me.*



Rao Farman Ali in Wikipedia